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Extant literature indicates that technology, and by implication its underlying knowledge base,
determines long-run economic performance. Absent from the literature with respect to
developing countries are quantitative assessments of the nexus between technology as knowledge
and economic performance. This paper imposes a simple production function on annual pooled
observations on Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa over the 1976-2004 period to estimate the
marginal impacts of technology as knowledge on economic performance. It finds that capital (k),
openness to trade (J), and even the share of government expenditure of GDP (G) among other
factors, influence economic performance. However, the economic performance of countries like
Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa depends largely on technology, technological change, and
the basic knowledge that forms the foundation for both. For instance, measured as a
homogenous “manna from heaven”, technology is the strongest determinant of real per capita
income of the three nations. The strength of technology as a determinant of performance
depends on the knowledge underpinnings of technology measured as the number of publications
(Q, q). Both Q and q are strongly correlated with the countries’ performance. This suggests that
the “social capability” and “technological congruence” of these countries are improving, and
that developing countries like Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa gain from increased
investment in knowledge-building activities including publishing. Obviously there is room for
strengthening results, but  this analysis has succeeded in producing a testable hypothesis.
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Abstract
Extant literature indicates that technology, and by implication its underlying knowledge base,
determines long-run economic performance. Absent from the literature with respect to developing
countries are quantitative assessments of the nexus between technology as knowledge and
economic performance. This paper imposes a simple production function on annual pooled
observations on Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa over the 1976-2004 period to estimate the
marginal impacts of technology as knowledge on economic performance. It finds that capital (k),
openness to trade (J), and even the share of government expenditure of GDP (G) among other
factors, influence economic performance. However, the economic performance of countries like
Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa depends largely on technology, technological change, and
the basic knowledge that forms the foundation for both. For instance, measured as a homogenous
“manna from heaven”, technology is the strongest determinant of real per capita income of the
three nations. The strength of technology as a determinant of performance depends on the
knowledge underpinnings of technology measured as the number of publications (Q, q). Both Q
and q are strongly correlated with the countries’ performance. This suggests that the “social
capability” and “technological congruence” of these countries are improving, and that
developing countries like Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa gain from increased investment
in knowledge-building activities including publishing. Obviously there is room for strengthening
results, but  this analysis has succeeded in producing a testable hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of technology, and the knowledge underlying
it, on the economic performance of developing countries using limited annual publications data
for the Southern African countries of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa over the 1976-2004
years. The estimation is important for policy and research reasons. For policy the results informs
predictions of long-run economic performance of developing countries like Botswana, Namibia,
and South Africa. Regarding research even a small contribution to the understanding of the
factors and forces that determine economic performance goes a long way towards opening up
opportunities for further examinations of the processes of technical progress and economic
development. Either way, the objective of this paper is valuable because recent research indicates
31See a sample list of papers on economic growth and technological change of African
countries at http://ideas.repec.org/g/afrogro.html .
2Income groups: according to the World Bank’s Atlas method in 2005, low-middle-
income economies are those with an annual gross national income per capita of $875 or less;
lower-middle-income ranges from $876 - $3,465; upper-middle-income lies between $3,466 and
$10, 725; and high income is $10,726 and above.
that during the past nine years some African countries have performed well relative to their
performance history, which raises the question of how that good performance can be accelerated,
expanded, and sustained (Amavilah, 2006).
Over the years growth experts have drawn up long lists of the factors that ostensibly explain the
performance of nations, see e.g., Collier and Gunning (1999), Temple (1999), Temple and
Johnson (1998), Fafchamps (2004), Barro (1991, 1999), Easterly and Levine (1997), Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994), Romer (1993), Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Sachs and Warner (1997), to
list only a few.1 In the case of African countries, however, factors undermining growth receive
more emphasis than factors promoting growth. In a paper, well-received by the profession, W.
Easterly and R. Levine (1997) state that “Africa’s growth tragedy” is a function of “low
schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange
markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure” (see both the abstract and
conclusion of that paper). This statement sounds like a regression of the negatives, in that both the
left-handside and right-handside variables are known to be negative and the results are predictable
a priori - but that is not the point. The point is that an opportunity cost of this negative over-
emphasis is the crowding-out of clarity about the factors that do promote Africa’s good
performance, which leaves us scared but less prepared about what to do. Thus, Kenneth Arrow in 
recent interview with Juan Dubra (2005) is correct that economists still neither understand well
the causes of growth, nor know why growth rates differ across economies. This situation is not
helpful to either policy or further research.
We focus on Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa because these three countries offer an
excellent study example, not because they are located in the same geographical region of the
world, but because they represent developing countries in their differences and similarities, again
making them a realistic case for other countries at different levels of development. In terms of the
differences  South Africa is the most technologically advanced of the trio in some respects.
However, its nascent democratic institutions and long Apartheid history have disadvantaged the
country in many other important areas. Consequently, South Africa is only an upper-middle-
income country. Botswana, on the other hand,  has been one of the fastest growing economies in
the world for nearly four decades (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson. 2001a, 2001b, 2002).
Rapid performance puts Botswana in the same income category as South Africa. Although
Namibia is a lower-middle income country, its modern sectors rival South Africa’s.2 
With respect to commonalities, all three economies are resource-based economies, with mining
(diamonds for Botswana and Namibia, and gold for South Africa) piggybacking each economy
4for many years. While South Africa’s industrial base is larger than those of Botswana and
Namibia combined, a significant number of people in all three countries depend on domestic
agriculture (mainly subsistence farming) for a livelihood. Also the three economies are similarly
export-oriented. Their macroeconomic environments and financial sectors are competitive as well
as closely linked. All three nations are members of the Southern African Customs Union within
the Rand monetary orbit and the socio-political economy of the Southern African Development
Community of the proposed African Union (Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2006, Aziakpono,
undated, Lange, 2004). The three countries’ going rates of interest and currency exchange are
interconnected. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the level of knowledge in these
countries is approximately the same (World Bank, 2001, Marope, 2005, Nicolson and Tjezeke,
undated). Moreover, it is also reasonable to say that the prospects for economic integration in this
part of Africa is greatest among these countries. In fact, not long ago the Namibian and South
African economies were essentially one economy. 
In Section 2 below we scan (not review) the relevant literature for the theoretical basis of the
empirical relations to be used.  Section 3 specifies those empirical relations as a simple
econometric model with technology as knowledge as one of its arguments. The fourth section
describes measurement issues. Section 5 presents the results, and the final section draws a
conclusion.
2. Knowledge, technology, production, and economic performance
Economists have always appreciated the role technology plays in the production process,
economic performance, and human welfare (Sampat, 2005, 2006, Rosenberg, 1982, Nelson, 2002,
Mokyr, 2005). However, early economic literature on most aspects of technology depended on
the assumption of exogeneity (Solow, 1956, 1957, Swan, 1956, 2002). The assumption served
two broad purposes: On one hand it was a good “measure of our ignorance” - i.e., our limited
knowledge (Abramovitz, 1979, 1986); on the other hand, it was consistent with the classical
linear regression model.
2.1. Knowledge and technology
A key driver of technology is human knowledge and pretensions about knowledge (von Hayek,
1937, Boulding, 1966, Loasky, 1999, Paul Romer, 1989, 1990, and Warsh,2006, Brooks, 1994).
However, although each economy is knowledgeable in its own way, not all knowledge is
productive. In addition, knowledge may exist people may know how use it productively; this is
what von Hayek (1974) calls “the pretence of knowldge”. Further still, in some economies
productive knowledge is unevenly distributed, and/or its rates of growth and spread limited,
across the population. This points out that there are institutional factors that influence knowledge
accumulation, and hence its impact on technology. In fact, long before the endogenous model
became a standard tool for accounting performance, Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall
and so on acknowledged the economic value of knowledge in production. For example, common
knowledge attributes the saying that “knowledge is power” to Bacon. Adam Smith (1976, p.1)
argues that the supply of the “necessaries and conveniences of life” depends on the “skill,
dexterity, and judgment” of the labor that produces it. For Alfred Marshall “knowledge is the
53Lewis’s definition of “economic organization” is that of Frank Knight (1921).
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 My own views on specialism in general have been shaped by George Stigler’s classic
The Intellectual and the Marketplace (1984), which I read many times as an undergraduate
most powerful engine of production; it enables us to subdue Nature and satisfy our wants”
(quoted in Gurak, 2004, p.1). More recently Bertrand Russel (1948), Thomas Sowell (1996) and
many others have stressed the importance of knowledge in different human endeavors, but W.
Arthur Lewis (1965) is particularly informative for our purpose. 
Lewis ranks knowledge high on his list of “the proximate causes of economic growth,” third only
after “the will to economize” and “economic institutions” (p. 164). The ranking suggests that a
production activity is principally a function of human effort. A key driver of human effort is the
desire for some reward, and the material wealth and comfort, which the reward provides.
However, the desire for material wealth in some societies may be limited by such things as
“asceticism”, social status, and cultural and physical considerations. The limitations suggest
either the lack or weakness of surrounding economic institutions. And where economic
institutions are absent, weak, or hostile towards private property rights, the rights to reward work
effort, and to foster specialization and voluntary exchange of comparative advantages are
similarly hampered. Consequently economic freedom is also curtailed, resulting in other
institutions such as religion being either too weak, too powerful, or downright immutable.3
According to Mueller (1983) and Choi (1983), Mancur Olson has named such a phenomenon
“institutional scelerosis”, and it happens because economic institutions determine and are
determined by knowledge are dysfunctional (North, 1990, Mokyr, 2005). In each society the
growth of knowledge depends on philosophical attitudes, class structure, inventions and research.
The application of knowledge also depends on attitudes to innovations. That norms are important
to optimizing behavior is a subject of George Akerlof’s (2007) “The missing motivation in
macroeconomics”.
Meadow (1992) defines knowledge as an informative data set known to be true because those
who believe it to be true are justified in believing it is true. In order to justify beliefs as true,
societies use education to condition beliefs into useful knowledge to serve their cultures - not all
initial conditions are exogenous. Alfred North Whitehead (1929) echoes that notion of knowledge
in stating that “ culture is [an] activity of thought, and [a] receptiveness to beauty and humane
feeling. ... [An education] ... aim[s] at producing men [women] who possess both culture and
expert knowledge in some special direction. Their expert knowledge will give them the ground to
start from, and their culture will lead them as deep as philosophy and as high as art. [Education
should produce useful ideas because].... [e]ducation with inert idea is not only useless: it is, above
all things, harmful, Corupti optimi, pessima. ... Every intellectual revolution which ever stirred
humanity to greatness has been a passionate protest against inert ideas” (pp. 1-2, [] added).
Economists would readily take the idea of specialization in the production of knowledge as
seriously as they would take specialization in other production activities. However, others like
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 50) would caution against the dangers of “too narrow
specialization,” and for the value of “integrative” knowledge.4
6student of economics, with an interest in the sociology of business organizations as agents of
change. 
5Charrtrand (2002, 2006) has assembled a searchable database containing over 1000
papers on the global technological competitiveness of knowledge-based economies.
For Bertrand Russell (1948, 1953), in contrast to Whitehead, vague and inexact definitions of
knowledge are “inevitable” (p. 154), mainly because “knowledge is a sub-class of true beliefs:
every case of knowledge is a case of true beliefs, but not vice versa.” Some true beliefs are
supported by evidence; they are deductively or inductively logical. Other true beliefs need no
proof of evidence; they are perceptive and non-logical. Russell also considers if it would be
sufficient to define knowledge as a self-evident and coherent “whole body of beliefs that promote
success” (p. 156). He rejects that definition because “the question ‘What do we mean by
knowledge’ is not one to which there is a definite and unambiguous answer anymore than to the
question ‘What do we mean by baldness’” (p. 158).
Whereas Russell is vague, Thomas Sowell (1996) is emphatically clear that knowledge and ideas
are not the same: “Ideas are everywhere, but knowledge is rare” (p. 3, italics added). What
Sowell means is that not all ideas qualify as knowledge. The few ideas that meet the generality
test for knowledge must be produced. The cost of producing knowledge limits the quantity of
knowledge available, and one way of cutting the cost of knowledge production is to specialize on
the basis of comparative advantages. That is the supply side of knowledge. The demand side is
the notion that the value of the marginal product of knowledge lies in the manner in which
knowledge facilitates decision-making. The demand for knowledge is a derived demand as
economists would say, and Sowell’s book deals with that subject.5
2.2. Technology and production
It is reasonable to conclude that knowledge is fundamental to technology and hence to economic
performance. As Keith Lewin (2006) puts it, “knowledge matters [a lot] for development”. It is
not hard to list examples of the influence of knowledge on technology, and vice versa (Driouchi,
Azelmad, and Anders, 2006). Jared Diamond’s (1999) Guns, Germs, and Steel is a recent popular
account, and Carlo Cipolla (1965) is another. In fact, the whole Industrial Revolution hinged upon
technological progress (Henderson, 1968). Technological progress depends on knowledge
(Mokyr, 2005). The seminal studies of human capital such as T.W. Schultz (1981) and Gary
Becker (1993), and reviews like Cohn (1979) are all examinations of varieties of knowledge.
Larry Samuelson (2004) sought a general model for knowledge in economic analysis in which....,
but most growth studies represent knowledge as education and/or literacy. These studies are
defensible on quantitative grounds; some of them are even groundbreaking. However, knowledge
is a lot more than education. Robert Lucas Jr (1993) in his study of Asian growth miracles came
to the conclusion that there were really no Asian miracles. What has happened is that Asian
economies learned to integrate “objects” and “ideas” in ways that promoted growth (see
Romer,1993, 1989, 1990).
7In an incisive chapter B.J. Loasky (1999) makes clear that observed growth rate differences
across economies, insomuch as such differences can be attributed to technological gaps, are
essentially “the problem of knowledge” (Von Hayek, 1937, 197?). To paraphrase, “the problem
of knowledge” is due to the incompleteness, uncertainty and fallibility of information, the
complexity of life itself, and the limited absorptive capacity and inability of people to manage
change in real time (cf. Kneller and Stevens, 2006). From Stiglitz (1986, 2000) we already know
the problems associated with incomplete, uncertain, and imperfect information. Loasky’s new
insight is that the uses of knowledge are almost always logical while outputs of knowledge are
non-logical. That alone makes the organization of  knowledge into a useful technology very
difficult, because technology itself is a complex and multidimensional matrix. Just take one
popular definition of technology: “Techonology is all the technical information about the
combination of inputs necessary for the production of ... output. [T]echnology differs from the
production function which presupposes technical efficiency and states the maximum output
obtainable from every possible input combination” (Henderson and Quandt, 1980, p. 66).  The
distinction between technology and the associated production function arises because picking the
“best input combination is a technical problem; [selecting] the best input combination for the
production of a particular output level is an economic question” (p. 66). Even so, the relationships
between knowledge and technology, and technology and production performance are hard to
miss. Hence, it is not surprising that Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that economic
performance is constrained by barriers to technology. A chief barrier to technology is world
knowledge, both general and scientific. The higher the barriers, the lower the level of technology,
the more investment in world knowledge is needed to lift economic performance. (Italicized
phrases are Parente and Prescott’s phrases). Using John Kay’s (2005) catch phrase knowledge can
be “big”, “small”, “precious”, as well as base in the sense of Max Lerner (1939).
Production can go on with a given level of technology in the short-run as the textbook suggests;
in the long run production requires technological change, and change requires knowledge. Joel
Mokyr (2005) describes the history of technology and the effects of technology on long-run
economic growth. The description demonstrates that technology presupposes knowledge. For a
given level of knowledge, a production activity can be characterized as
where Y is some output , A is a level of exogenous technology as knowledge, and X is a matrix of
inputs (factors of production). Pioneering growth accounting models of the general form (1),
among them Solow (1957, 1956) and Swan (1956, 2002), stunned observers with the finding that
The difference,  became known as the “Solow/Swan residual”
and is a “measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1979, 1986) resulting from incomplete
specification (e.g. wrong or simplistic functional form) of (1), or misspecification (missing or
wrong variables) of X. It made good sense that the missing suspects became entrepreneurship,
human capital, and real time. Including these variables allows X to drive A and vice-versa so that
(1) can be restated as
(1)
86For simplicity we write Z, when we really mean Z’ = Z - J - B.
Eq. (2) gives different perspectives of the role of technology in production. It reveals that when
Jan Fagerberg (1994) and Fagerberg, Knell, and Srholec (2004) find that technology gaps explain
international growth rate differences, they are agreeing with Romer (1989, 1990, 1993) that
implying that To say limited technology
undermines Africa’s economic performance, for instance, is to imply a kind of knowledge deficit
there.
We assume that a country’s level of economic activity, and therefore its performance, depends,
besides conventional factors of production, on its level of technology. Technology is a composite
knowledge from different sources. JM Keynes (1973) said it well that “part of our knowledge is
direct; and part by argument” (p. 3). This paper suggests that published works are organized
arguments; arguments are knowledge, and knowledge is technology. And so, we can argue that
for a given level of technology (Ai(t)) at time period t a country’s measure of economic
performance (Yi(t)) depends on it population (Ni(t)), its stock of physical capital (Ki(t)), its initial
conditions as measured by its level of economic performance in year t = 0, (Yi(0)), and its other
variables (Zi(t)), i.e.,
In recent years international organizations such as the World Economic Forum have constructed
indices of policy variables that would fit in Z. Unfortunately such data is available only for the
most recent years. Two popular conventional elements of Zi(t) for which data is available are
inflation rate (Ai(t)) and trade openness (Ii(t)). Taking these variables as a part of Z, and plugging
them into (3) we get6
Next we deflate (3') by dividing both sides by Ai(t). Further division of the result by Yi(0) gives
real economic performance relative to initial conditions. Ignoring the time subscript, from (3) per
capita performance is
(2)
(3)
(3')
(4)
9where
3.  Empirical specifications: Technology as knowledge and economic performance
To estimate the role of technology-as-knowledge in economic performance we set up a practical
econometric model and outline the estimation procedure before describing key variables and data,
and presenting the results.
3.1.  Econometric model
In logarithmic terms, we specify the econometric model as 
We estimate a Kmenta-type Cross-sectionally Correlated and Time-wise Autoregressive Model
(Kmenta, 1986, pp. 622-625, cf. Baltagi, 1999). We put forward different specifications in four
broad versions: Version 1, Version 2,  Version 3, and Version 4. Some the versions assume that
Ai is homogenous. However, we also follow J. Benhabib and M. Spiegel’s (1994) account of
knowledge (human capital) (a) as a factor of production, and (b) as a technological force affecting
performance through an unspecified Nelson-Phelps channel. This is in recognition of the fact that
knowledge is more than an educated labor force alone; knowledge depends on the “quality of the
population” in the sense of Schultz (1981) and Becker (1993). For that reason, we let
where A(0) is the initial level of technology, is some measure of knowledge, in our caseq Si i⊇
publications, and Si is a measure of human capital, such as years of schooling in Jones (1997)
among many other authors. Then, we can restate (5) as 
3.2. Estimation procedure
The estimation procedure pools together three cross-sections and 29 time-series data into 87
observations. Then we take 4 distinct steps. The first set of regressions assumes the level of
technology to be the constant term. The second set of regressions introduce “aggregate
(5)
(6)
(7)
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knowledge” (Qi) in the process. The third step disaggregates Qi into four distinct components:
science (q1), social science (q2), arts-and-humanities (q3), and interdisciplinary (q4). In other
words, The specification of Qi assumes that technology is a functionQ q q q qi = + + +1 2 3 4 .
of knowledge, and that knowledge falls into four broad faculties: pure science, pure social
science, pure arts-and-humanities, and everything else in between. Hence, to the extent economic
performance is a function of technology, , and ity f A X= ( , ), A g q t= ( , ) X h A S t= ( , , ),
follows that  This gives four solutions for q, S, and t,y f g q t h A S t f g q t h g q t S t= =( ( , ), ( , , )) ( ( , ), ( ( , ), , )).
with A acting as the variable of integration (Amavilah, 1998).
The final step assesses apparent conditional convergence across the three cross-sections.
“Convergence” is estimated as,
where   y* indicates change in y of
Botswana and Namibia relative to South Africa from the perspective of 1976, and y* … y(0), see
(10) and (11) below. In this case economic performance is “converging” if , and it is
converging because knowledge is converging if   In other words, cross-country performance
differences narrow with an increased level of economic development and with reduction in the
difference of the level of knowledge across economies. The opposite is not necessarily true. 
4. Measurement issues: Variables, data, and data sources
Unless otherwise stated we designate real gross variables with uppercase letters and per capita
real variables with lowercase letters. Whenever appropriate variables are in constant 2000 U.S.
dollars and are dated, although the t-subscript may be skipped for convenience.
The dependent variable is gross domestic product (Yi, yi). For any ith country (Y, y) depends on
its population (Ni), the rate of investment in physical capital (Ki, ki), and the country’s degree of
openness to foreign trade (Ji). For brevity’s sake we also drop the i-subscript unless absolutely
necessary.
The ratio of government spending to GDP (G) and the ratio of GNP to GDP (E) are also
important considerations. Government’s share of spending in GDP is an expression of how well
government uses public resources. In developing countries governments finance the largest
components of human capital building: education and health. A positive impact of G on y would
suggest good government policies in a variety of ways (see Lee (1996) for the case of South
Korea); from a negative coefficient one can infer growth-retardant factors, like corruption, see,
e.g., Mauro (1995, 1998) and Choi (1983, Chapter 7).
(8)
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Table 1a. Basic Statistics, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa - 1976-2004
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
RGDPCH      87   5958.0       1698.1      0.28837E+07   2207.8       9145.9   
CI          87   14.280       6.3543       40.377       4.8600       33.210   
OPENC       87   91.111       34.363       1180.8       37.910       159.17   
SCI         87   287.84       492.55      0.24261E+06   1.0000       1961.0   
SOCSCI      87   115.48       153.62       23600.       5.0000       600.00   
ARTHUM      87   40.126       55.071       3032.8       1.0000       168.00   
INTER       87   28.529       42.744       1827.1      0.00000E+00   197.00   
TKNOW       87   415.08       649.11      0.42135E+06   7.0000       2518.0   
INIT        87   6.9655       15.013       225.38      -18.000       38.000   
CY          87  0.96645      0.38395      0.14741      0.19600E-01   1.6299    
G           87   27.323       6.1859       38.266       14.500       39.550   
CGNP        87   96.234       5.8173       33.841       77.460       107.07   
Table 1b - Descriptive Statistics, Botswana - 1976-2004
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
RGDPCH      29   5064.1       1947.5      0.37927E+07   2207.8       9051.7   
CI          29   20.909       5.2246       27.296       12.780       33.210   
OPENC       29   103.82       15.208       231.27       77.500       132.25   
SCI         29   45.966       35.598       1267.2       8.0000       122.00   
SOCSCI      29   27.552       11.214       125.76       11.000       50.000   
ARTHUM      29   4.6207       3.0870       9.5296       1.0000       12.000   
INTER       29   6.4828       4.5326       20.544      0.00000E+00   21.000   
TKNOW       29   72.379       44.072       1942.3       17.000       154.00   
INIT        29   24.000       8.5147       72.500       10.000       38.000    
CY          29    0.54713      0.33497      0.11220      0.19600E-01   1.0204 
G           29   22.473       4.7014       22.103       14.500       32.100   
CGNP        29   96.788       5.4859       30.095       87.130       107.07   
KEY
RGDPCH /y = real per capita GDP chained.
CI / k = Investment share of real GDP.
OPENC  / J= (export + imports)/real GDP. 
SCI  / q1 = Annual number of science papers published.
SOCSCI /q2 = Annual number of social science papers published
ARTHUM  / q3 =Annual number of arts and humanities papers published. 
INTER  / q4 = Annual numbers of papers not identified as q1, q2, q3, or q4.
TKNOW  / Q = q1 + q2 + q3 + q4.
INIT  / z = Number of years since independence.
CY = y* = Level of development.
G =Government share of real GDP.
CGNP  / E = GNP/GDP ratio, economic penetration.
12
Table 1c - Descriptive Statistics, Namibia - 1976-2004
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
RGDPCH      29   5109.3       283.72       80495.       4504.6       5814.5   
CI          29   12.694       4.1145       16.929       4.8600       22.950   
OPENC       29   120.49       21.496       462.10       89.050       159.17   
SCI         29   60.586       48.116       2315.2       1.0000       141.00   
SOCSCI      29   20.241       7.4530       55.547       5.0000       38.000   
ARTHUM      29   6.5172       3.6314       13.187       1.0000       16.000   
INTER       29   3.6552       2.5812       6.6626      0.00000E+00   9.0000   
TKNOW       29   83.690       52.877       2796.0       7.0000       169.00   
INIT        29  0.51724       8.9587       80.259      -14.000       15.000   
YEAR        29   1990.0       8.5147       72.500       1976.0       2004.0   
CY          29   1.2550      0.22162      0.49113E-01  0.88650       1.6299    
G           29   34.442       3.3887       11.483       24.410       39.550   
CGNP        29   95.143       8.4315       71.091       77.460       105.12 
Table 1d - Descriptive Statistics, and South Africa - 1976-2004
NAME        N   MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
RGDPCH      29   7700.5       515.50      0.26574E+06   7016.3       9145.9   
CI          29   9.2379       2.3113       5.3419       6.7500       15.520   
OPENC       29   49.020       6.0803       36.970       37.910       61.450   
SCI         29   756.97       632.10      0.39955E+06   83.000       1961.0   
SOCSCI      29   298.66       141.95       20150.       127.00       600.00   
ARTHUM      29   109.24       43.235       1869.3       42.000       168.00   
INTER       29   75.448       46.479       2160.3       17.000       197.00   
TKNOW       29   1089.2       763.80      0.58339E+06   230.00       2518.0   
INIT        29  -3.6207       8.9339       79.815      -18.000       11.000   
YEAR        29   1990.0       8.5147       72.500       1976.0       2004.0   
CY          29   1.0972      0.73378E-01  0.53843E-02   1.0000       1.3035    
G           29   25.054       1.3228       1.7498       23.190       27.940   
CGNP        29   96.771      0.95129      0.90495       95.490       98.220   
KEY
RGDPCH /y = real per capita GDP chained.
CI / k = Investment share of real GDP.
OPENC  / J= (export + imports)/real GDP. 
SCI  / q1 = Annual number of science papers published.
SOCSCI /q2 = Annual number of social science papers published
ARTHUM  / q3 =Annual number of arts and humanities papers published. 
INTER  / q4 = Annual numbers of papers not identified as q1, q2, q3, or q4.
TKNOW  / Q = q1 + q2 + q3 + q4.
INIT  / z = Number of years since independence.
CY = y* = Level of development.
G =Government share of real GDP.
CGNP  / E = GNP/GDP ratio, economic penetration. 
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The variable E / GNP/GDP measures the depth of the distribution of income, see, e.g., Bertocchi
and Canova (1996). A high E represents a large discrepancy between GNP and GDP, reflecting
competitive interactions between elements of expropriatory and appropriatory institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002, 2001a, 2001b).
The data source for y, k, J, G, and E is the Penn World Table (PWT) 6.2 (Heston, Summers, Aten,
2006). General definitions for these variables are at the bottom of Table 1; for technical issues see
the PWT Data Appendix and Technical Documentation.  
The aggregate knowledge variable (Qi) is the annual number of papers on the ith country:
where qi1 represents science papers, qi2 represents social science papers, q13 is for arts-and-
humanities papers, and qi4 are interdisciplinary papers. The latter came about because in some cases 
which means that some papers counted more or less  than once. Since knowledge is
cumulative, including this variable independently is appropriate because it does not have the effect
of double counting, and perform a function similar to an interaction term. The data source for (Q, q)
is Thomson Scientific (2006) available at http://portal.isiknowledge.com.
Since PWT data are stated in real terms already, that is net of inflation; it is fine for us to assume
that zi is simply a country specific dummy variable of many unspecified dimensions. It is defined as
the number of years since a country attained its political independence. For example, in 1976,
Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa had been independent for 10 years, -14 years, and -18 years,
respectively. By 2004 Botswana was 39 years old, Namibia was 15, and South Africa only 11. The
coefficient of this variable estimates the impacts of factors like  political freedom and democracy
(Levine, 1995, Perssons, 2005, Schumpeter, 1950, Landes, 1998). 
Lastly, the level of economic development (y*) is important to economic performance. To capture
that difference we consider the change in the level of economic activity for Botswana and Namibia
relative to South Africa, taking the initial year (1976) as the base, i.e.,
where the numerator is the difference in the level of development between the ith economy and
South Africa in the tth year and the denominator is the difference in the same in the initial year (t =
0). Then relative to its own level of development in 1976, the level of development of the South
African economy in the tth year becomes
(10)
18
a P
ar
en
th
es
es
 a
re
 t-
ra
tio
s 
at
 
th
e 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
v
el.
 
Sq
ua
re
 
br
ac
ke
ts
 a
re
 D
 
st
at
ist
ics
.
Ta
bl
e 
2 
- D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
 
o
f R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, U
S$
, B
ot
sw
a
n
a
, 
N
am
ib
ia
, 
a
n
d 
So
u
th
 
A
fr
ic
a
 
-
 
19
76
-2
00
4 
 
(V
er
sio
n
 
1 
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s)a
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n 
1.
1
V
er
sio
n
 1
.2
V
er
sio
n
 1
.3
ln
 
(C
o
n
st
an
t /
 
A
)
9.
82
56
 (2
9.
81
1)
8.
94
00
 (1
0.
21
2) 
8.
69
58
 (7
.
94
59
)
ln
 
(In
v
es
tm
en
t-
G
D
P 
/
 
k)
-
0.
02
38
 (-
0.
86
15
)
-
0.
00
69
 (-
0.
17
41
)
0.
00
85
 (0
.
18
89
)
ln
 
(O
pe
n
n
es
s 
/
 
J)
-
0.
15
5 
(-3
.
56
95
)
0.
01
27
 (0
.
15
64
)
-
0.
01
23
 (-
0.
28
21
)
ln
 
(C
o
u
n
tr
y 
du
m
m
y 
=
 z
)
-
0.
01
02
 (-
0.
52
43
)
-
0.
03
92
 (-
2.
13
2)
-
0.
03
57
 (-
1.
67
67
)
ln
 
(“K
n
o
w
led
ge
”
 
/
 
Q)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(S
cie
n
ce
 /
 
q 1
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
( S
o
cia
l S
cie
n
ce
  
/
 
q 2
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(A
rt
s-
n
-
H
u
m
an
iti
es
 
/
 
q 3
)
0.
16
87
1 
(6.
74
52
)
0.
07
05
 2
.8
79
1
0.
03
69
 1
.0
89
5
0.
05
41
 2
.8
90
4
ln
 
(G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t /
 
G
)
0.
00
99
 (0
.
15
86
)
0.
37
38
 (5
.
29
73
)
0.
54
68
 (6
.
70
05
)
ln
 
(G
N
P/
G
D
P 
/
 
E)
-
0.
41
57
 (-
1.
86
15
D
ev
elo
pm
en
t L
ev
el 
/
 
y*
-
0.
44
58
 (-
7.
79
80
)
Bu
se
 R
-s
qu
ar
e
Bu
se
 R
aw
 M
om
en
t R
-s
qu
ar
e
St
d.
 
Er
ro
r 
Es
tim
at
e
Lo
gl
ik
eli
ho
o
d 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
D
W
 
[D
]
N
or
m
al 
t
0.
38
11
0.
99
94
0.
93
00
4
-
63
4.
80
2
0.
72
88
 [0
.
42
66
]
-
4.
49
34
0.
67
22
0.
99
97
0.
98
46
8
-
65
1.
53
4
0.
88
78
 [0
.
42
33
]
-
3.
55
80
0.
74
69
0.
99
97
0.
98
15
4
-
65
8.
45
5
1.
00
54
 [0
.
39
64
]
-
3.
52
10
19
b P
ar
en
th
es
es
 a
re
 t-
ra
tio
s 
at
 
th
e 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
v
el.
 
Sq
ua
re
 
br
ac
ke
ts
 a
re
 D
 
st
at
ist
ics
.
Ta
bl
e 
3 
- D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, 
U
S$
, B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
, 
N
am
ib
ia
, a
n
d 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
 -
 
19
76
-2
00
4
(V
er
sio
n
 
2 
= 
V
er
sio
n
 
1 
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s 
pu
rg
ed
)b
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n
 
2.
1
V
er
sio
n
 
2.
2
V
er
sio
n
 
2.
3
ln
 (C
o
n
st
an
t /
 
A
)
9.
19
04
 (2
2.
77
2)
8.
55
32
 (9
.
25
62
)
8.
44
42
 (7
.
91
04
)
ln
 (L
ag
ge
d 
y 
/
 
y(t
-1
)
0.
05
61
 (4
.
50
37
)
0.
03
78
 (3
.
10
50
)
0.
03
93
 (3
.
06
92
)
ln
 (I
n
v
es
tm
en
t-
G
D
P 
/
 
k)
-
0.
07
26
 (-
1.
92
26
)
-
0.
02
49
 (-
0.
59
86
)
-
0.
01
75
 (-
0.
39
59
)
ln
 (O
pe
n
n
es
s 
/
 
J)
-
0.
30
31
 (-
4.
74
05
)
0.
00
56
 (0
.
06
31
)
-
0.
07
72
 (-
0.
91
79
)
ln
 (C
o
u
n
tr
y 
du
m
m
y 
=
 z
)
-
0.
03
61
 (-
1.
47
21
)
-
0.
03
77
 (-
1.
96
27
)
-
0.
03
58
 (-
1.
71
95
)
ln
 (“
K
n
o
w
le
dg
e /
 
Q)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(S
ci
en
ce
 /
 
q 1
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
( S
o
ci
al
 
Sc
ie
n
ce
 
 
/
 
q 2
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(A
rt
s-
n
-
H
u
m
an
iti
es
 
/
 
q 3
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
/
 
q 4
)
0.
14
62
 (5
.
24
49
)
0.
05
39
 (2
.
24
06
)
0.
04
06
 (1
.
19
16
)
0.
04
87
 (2
.
41
73
)
-
0.
01
37
 (-
0.
67
16
)
ln
 (G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t /
 
G
)
0.
25
79
 (3
.
34
72
)
0.
40
60
 (5
.
83
18
)
0.
49
55
 (5
.
95
21
)
ln
 (G
N
P/
G
D
P 
/
 
E)
-
0.
39
27
 ( -
1.
89
63
)
-
0.
31
02
 (-
1.
41
47
)
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t L
ev
el
 /
 
y*
-
0.
37
29
 (-
6.
37
28
)
-
0.
39
53
 (-
7.
91
63
)
-
0.
43
45
 -(
8.
13
48
)
B
us
e 
R
-s
qu
ar
e
B
us
e 
R
aw
 
M
om
en
t R
-s
qu
ar
e
St
d.
 
Er
ro
r 
Es
tim
at
e
Lo
gl
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
D
W
 [ D
]
D
ur
bi
n 
H
N
or
m
al
 
t
0.
60
61
0.
99
92
09
66
11
-
65
3.
33
4
0.
80
25
 [0
.
55
34
]
5.
19
74
-
5.
26
35
0.
74
15
0.
99
97
0.
98
00
7
-
64
9.
84
5
0.
97
35
 [0
.
44
91
]
4.
21
92
-
3.
98
37
0.
77
87
0.
99
96
0.
97
75
1
-
65
4.
10
9
1.
05
36
 [0
.
42
14
]
3.
95
89
-
3.
53
96
20
Ta
bl
e 
4 
- D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, 
U
S$
, B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
, 
N
am
ib
ia
, a
n
d 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
 -
 
19
76
-2
00
4
(V
er
sio
n
 
3 
= 
V
er
sio
n
 
2 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s 
w
ith
o
u
t a
 c
o
n
st
an
t t
er
m
)
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n 
3.
1
V
er
sio
n
 3
.2
V
er
sio
n
 3
.3
ln
 
(In
v
es
tm
en
t-
G
D
P 
/
 
k)
0.
09
83
 (1
.
37
90
)
0.
15
21
 (2
.
31
86
)
0.
25
35
 (3
.
26
49
)
ln
 
(O
pe
n
n
es
s 
/
J)
0.
91
07
 (9
.
42
86
)
1.
00
01
 (1
1.
27
8)
0.
92
11
 (8
.
10
97
)
ln
 
(C
o
u
n
tr
y 
du
m
m
y 
=
 z
)
0.
17
90
 (4
.
16
97
)
-
0.
05
88
 (-
1.
62
42
)
-
0.
06
28
 (-
1.
58
44
)
ln
 
(“K
n
o
w
led
ge
 
/
Q)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(S
cie
n
ce
 /
q 1
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(A
rt
s-
n
-
H
u
m
an
iti
es
 
/
q 3
)
0.
43
77
 (1
4.
07
1)
0.
20
29
 (5
.
10
40
)
0.
20
08
 (6
.
48
49
)
ln
 
(G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t /
 
G
)
1.
18
37
 (1
0.
98
3)
0.
66
25
 (5
.
72
13
)
0.
96
54
 (7
.
00
86
)
D
ev
elo
pm
en
t L
ev
el 
/
 
y*
-
0.
42
06
 (-
4.
04
2)
-
0.
52
74
 )-
6.
12
34
)
-
0.
60
87
 (-
7.
19
71
)
Bu
se
 R
-s
qu
ar
e
Bu
se
 R
aw
 M
om
en
t R
-s
qu
ar
e
St
d.
 
Er
ro
r 
Es
tim
at
e
Lo
gl
ik
eli
ho
o
d 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
D
W
 
[ D
]
N
or
m
al 
t
0.
23
00
0.
99
79
0.
99
37
8
-
71
0.
67
5
1.
77
17
 [0
.
40
16
5]
-
0.
55
80
0.
23
28
0.
99
78
0.
98
90
1
-
69
6.
39
4
1.
50
63
 [0
.
17
71
]
-
0.
91
58
0.
59
16
0.
99
88
0.
98
82
2
-
71
1.
55
6
1.
54
28
 [0
.
16
88
]
-
1.
39
24
21
Ta
bl
e 
5 
- D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, 
U
S$
, B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
, 
N
am
ib
ia
, a
n
d 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
 -
 
19
76
-2
00
4
(V
er
sio
n
 
4 
= 
V
er
sio
n
 
3 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s 
w
ith
 
a 
lag
ge
d 
y 
an
d 
no
 
co
n
st
an
t t
er
m
)
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n 
3.
1
V
er
sio
n
 
3.
2
V
er
sio
n
 
4.
3
ln
 
(L
ag
ge
d 
y 
/
 
y(t
-1
))
0.
05
99
 (2
.
92
67
)
0.
01
51
 (0
.
92
18
)
0.
03
49
 (1
.
74
70
)
ln
 (I
n
v
es
tm
en
t-
G
D
P 
/
 
k)
0.
06
86
 (0
.
92
87
)
0.
15
35
 (2
.
26
45
)
0.
22
76
 (2
.
95
62
)
ln
 (O
pe
n
n
es
s 
/
 
J)
0.
77
51
 (8
.
00
86
)
0.
98
29
 (1
0.
87
9)
0.
92
41
 (8
.
23
68
)
ln
 (C
o
u
n
tr
y 
du
m
m
y 
/
 
z)
0.
19
03
 (4
.
09
98
)
-
0.
06
77
 (-
1.
89
22
)
-
0.
05
71
 (-
1.
46
28
)
ln
 (“
K
n
o
w
le
dg
e 
/
 
Q)
 
 
 
 
ln
 
(S
ci
en
ce
 /
 
q 1
)
 
 
 
 
ln
 (A
rt
s-
n
-H
u
m
an
iti
es
 
/
 
q 3
)
?
0.
20
12
 (5
.
15
30
)
0.
18
86
 (5
.
86
99
)
ln
 (G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t /
 
G
)
1.
22
76
 (1
1.
89
9)
0.
88
93
 (6
.
28
65
)
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t L
ev
el
 /
 
y*
-
0.
39
42
 (-
3.
57
04
)
-
0.
03
49
 (-
6.
85
40
)
B
us
e 
R
-s
qu
ar
e
B
us
e 
R
aw
 
M
om
en
t R
-s
qu
ar
e
St
d.
 
Er
ro
r 
Es
tim
at
e
Lo
gl
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
Fu
n
ct
io
n
D
W
 [D
]
D
ur
bi
n
 
H
N
or
m
al
 
t
0.
91
0
0.
98
94
8
0.
99
47
3
-
70
7.
54
2
1.
72
23
 [0
.
03
05
]
0.
29
03
3
-
0.
44
36
0.
47
88
0.
62
03
0.
99
88
0.
98
42
2
-
71
0.
68
7
1.
55
55
 [0
.
14
88
]
1.
14
23
-
1.
83
23
22
 The coefficient on y* is essentially the relative coefficient of “convergence”, similar, not identical, to
the so-called “catch-up effect.” 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the key variables just discussed, first across the three cross-
sections (Table1a), and then by country in Tables 1b-1d. Figure 1 plots various relationships between
the dependent variable (Y,y) and independent variables as described above.
Table 1 is obvious; from the figures it is clear that real GDP has generally risen over the years.
However, the rate of change appears to have been constrained by the accumulation of capital (k) and
the expansion of trade (openness = J). It also appears that the slack was picked up by the accumulation
of knowledge measured by the number of published papers (Q, q). The results seek to quantify that
appearance.
 5. Results
On the assumption of a homogeneous level of technology (A) measured as the constant term in
regression form, from the initial estimations of , only G has a positivey Af k z G y E= ( , , , , , )τ ∆
coefficient. The constant term (lnA = 9.822) is very large. Introducing Q into the estimation, assuming
A is some linear function of Q and a random error term (:), i.e., , the results show thatA aQ= + µ
one publication adds seventeen cents ($0.17) to per capita income, while an increase of one dollar in
government expenditure has the effect of raising real GDP per capita by about thirty-nine cents ($0.37).
However, the key variables, and , contribute very little to income per capita. In fact, an increase ofk τ
one percentage point in the investment-GDP ratio reduces per capita GDP by 0.6%, whereas the
contribution of openness to trade is only slightly over one percent (1.2%).
Disaggregating Q finds that  Specifically, q1 8 6 y 8 by 7.1%, q2 8 6 y 8by 4.5%,∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂lnln lnln lnln .yq yq yq1 2 3 0> > >
and q3 8 6 y 8 by 5.9%. Although the inclusion of Q and it parts improved the generalized explanatory
power measured by the Buse R-square, parameter estimates remained technically inefficient, and the
constant term stayed above the mean of the dependent variable (8.6452). The very low Durbin-Watson
statistics indicate serious correlation, motivating the inclusion of the lagged y, y(t-1).
The inclusion of y(t-1) merely redistributes the weights of the variables; the size of the intercept does
not change much. In addition, J now has a negative sign and k a positive, but both are statistically
insignificant. The short run impacts of Q and its components are statistically strong. Econometric
adjustments such as dropping all insignificant variables, do no more than just shifting the problems of
insignificance and wrong signs elsewhere. Tables 2 - 5 reveal that technology explains much of the 
(11)
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observed variations in per capita income of developing countries like Botswana, Namibia, and South
Africa. Tables 4 and 5 derive from the idea that the level of technology (A) has at least three
components: one due to random error (:A), the second due to economic efficiency (AE), and the third to
technological progress (AT), i.e, . Using this argument, the inclusion of Q reducedA A AE T A= + + µ
A to 9.3588, a decrease of only 0.2331, leaving the residual still well above the mean of the dependent
variable. More specifically the marginal impact of a publication on real per capita income is about
sixteen cents ($0.155).
Disaggregate knowledge into four faculties: science (q1), social science (q2), arts-n-humanities (q3), and
an interdisciplinary term (q4). The explanatory power of the regressions improves; it now ranges from
38% to 75% of the variations in per capita income being explained by the included variables. Three
findings stand out. First, the time elapse since independence (z) has a negative partial coefficient, which
is understandable. By 2004 Botswana had been independent for more than three decades. Interpreted as
a measure of democracy, economic freedom, the rule of law, historical legacies, and so on, the negative
sign on z is consistent with increasing evidence that show negative impacts of historical legacies on
performance (Nunn, 2005, 2004, Bertocchi and Canova, 1996, Masanjala and Papageorgiu, 200, Lange,
2004). In this respect Namibia and South Africa have not even begun to recover and the situation
weighs down on the average performance for the three nations. Also negative is the impact of economic
penetration measured by the GNP-GDP ratio (E). For each one dollar’s worth of an increase in this
ratio, 40 cents’ worth of real GDP per capita is lost. This captures the extractive nature of these three
economies. 
Likewise Botswana and Namibia have closed the absolute gap in the level of economic development
between them and South Africa, that is, income increases as the gap narrows. However, the relative gap
persists. For instance, Botswana’s per capita income has converged to that of South Africa more than
Namibia’s has, which makes sense because Namibia and South Africa started off more similar and are
now “diverging” as each country attempts to assert its political independence. South Africa has not
progressed a lot past its 1976 level. This too is to be expected; prior to independence in 1994, most
black South Africans were excluded from the modern accounting of the economy and so per capita
income was overstated. The end of Apartheid meant the inclusion of many more people in the economy,
and so per capita income fell.
The results are unchanged when y(t-1) is included . Notable from these tables is that
and with being the weakest link at the 5%0 1400 01700,. .ln ln< <d y d Q d y d qln ln [ . , . ),∈ 0 035 0 071 d y d qln ln 2
significance level. These findings are encouraging, although the wrong signs on key variables k and J
are troubling. How can these results be corrected?  
Tables 4 and 5 present results from estimations that set the constant term to zero,  i.e.,
As is the usual case with “noconstant” regressions, and in this case A aQ a q a q a q a q= = + + +1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 .
given that our pooled series has more time-series (T) than cross-sections (M), the “generalized
proportion of variations” (Buse R-square)  in y that is explained by the included variables is reasonable;
it ranges from 23% to 78%.. Not bad at all, because it is possible for an R-square to be negative in
situations like this one. And, the coefficients on both k and J are positive and statistically significant at
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the 5% level. The marginal impact of technology as knowledge in the aggregate or in the disaggregate is
also positively strong, especially for q1 and q3.
Table 6 and Figure 2  present tentative results for the estimation of (8)  - apparent convergence. These
are apparent, rather than convergence measures a la Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and the
subsequent literature such as Islam (1995), Higgins, levy, and Young (2006), and Jones (1997, 2002).
But it is consistent with Bernard and Jones (1995) in establishing the link between  From the tables as
well as Figure 2, it is abundantly clear that Q and q are important to real per capita GDP, with the
contribution of science publications being the strongest. The level of development is also essential, but it
is not clear whether it can explain convergence.  
6. Conclusion
What do we conclude from the results, and what are the implications of the conclusion for policy and
further research? This paper examines the marginal impacts of technology as knowledge on the
economic performance of three Southern African countries: Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. It
imposes a simple production function on annual pooled observations of the three countries over the
1976-2004 period.  Based on summary statistics the results of the examination agree with Robert
Barro’s (1991) conclusion that regression analyses often leave unexplained factors that determine the
economic performance of developing countries. Primary factors such as capital, and secondary or higher
resources like trade, and even Government, are important to economic performance. Even so, a more
persuasive case than the factors of production is that the economic performance of countries like
Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa depends increasingly on technology, technological change, and
the basic knowledge that forms the foundation for both. Yet in developing countries quantitative
assessments of the nexus between technology as knowledge and performance are limited. The analysis
of this paper finds that, measured as a homogenous ‘Manna from Heaven”, technology is the strongest
determinant of real per capita income in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. Moreover, there is a
clear indication that some of what is going on in the black-box can in fact be explained by the
knowledge underpinnings of technology, represented by aggregate Q and disaggregate q number of
publications as proxies for that knowledge. Both Q and q are strongly correlated with the countries’
economic performance. More precisely the economic performance of nations benefits most from science
(q1) and arts-n-humanities publications (q3). Social science (q2) publications have a positive but
statistically insignificant effect on real per capita GDP.
Following Abramowitz’s (1979,1986) interpretation the positive effect of science on real GDP per
capita supports the notion of the increasing “social capability” of these countries. The strong correlation
between arts-n-humanities and real income per capita signals improving “technological congruence”
along with enhanced absorptive capacity. The positive, but weak, effect of social science on economic
performance is a reflection of an excess supply of publications in this area, as well as associated
deadweight losses as evident from the low marginal impacts.
The policy implication of the conclusion is that developing countries like Botswana, Namibia, and
South Africa would gain from increased investment in knowledge-building activities including
publishing - apparently a paper is worth more than its light weight. This potential gain justifies further
research on the topic. For example, one may enlarge the sample size, and explore better and richer sets
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of data than those utilized here. Another may deploy alternative estimators and estimation techniques. A
third, may use sophisticated functional forms which might yield better results than we have here.
Despite its limitations, the results of this analysis are encouraging.
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